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 Abstract  
 
Given that the communities which are most vulnerable to HIV often have little 
control over their own lives and their health-related behaviour, HIV prevention 
policies increasingly recommend that HIV prevention projects work to build 
relationships with powerful external groups (i.e. build ‘bridging social capital’). 
To aid conceptualisation of how community organisations may build such 
social capital, this paper outlines a typology of strategies for influencing local 
stakeholders. We present a study of 2 successful Indian sex workers' 
organisations, VAMP and DMSC, focusing on how the organisations have 
influenced 3 groups of stakeholders, namely, police, politicians, and local 
social organisations. Interviews with project employees (45), with 
representatives of the 3 groups of stakeholders (12), and fieldwork diaries 
recording 6 months of observation in each site provide the data.  
 
Three approaches emerged. ‘Persuading’ refers to the practice of holding 
information-giving meetings with stakeholders and requesting their support. It 
appears to build ‘weak social ties’. ‘Protesting’ entails a collective 
confrontation with stakeholders, and appears to be useful when the 
stakeholder has a public image to protect that would be tarnished by protest, 
and when the protestors can stake a legitimate claim that their rights are 
being denied. In ‘exchanging favours’, the sex workers’ organisations find 
creative ways to position themselves as offering valued resources to their 
stakeholders (such as useful information on criminal activities for the police, a 
stage and audience for politicians, or a celebration for local social 
organisations), as incentives for their support. In conclusion, we discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, the implications for social 
capital theorising, and implications for community HIV prevention.  
 
 
Key-words: sex workers; India; community mobilization; partnerships; social 
capital; HIV prevention  
 As community organisations are increasingly being called upon to take the 
lead for HIV prevention (NACO, 2007; UNAIDS, 2007), recent attention has 
highlighted the importance of such organisations building alliances with other 
groupings (Nair & Campbell, 2008). Such alliances are hoped to compensate 
for the fact that the communities most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS are often 
communities that are marginalised from sources of power and with little 
control over their own health-related behaviour. Theoretically, such arguments 
are often informed by concepts of social capital, and in particular, ‘bridging 
social capital’. ‘Bridging social capital’ refers to networks which link a 
community to potentially beneficial groups beyond that local community (Gittel 
& Vidal, 1998). Little is known about how communities forge such 
relationships – in other words, how bridging social capital is created. This 
paper seeks to contribute to understandings of the strategies which 
community organisations use to build beneficial connections with local 
groupings. We call these local groupings ‘stakeholders’, since, to the extent 
that they have a relation with the marginalised community, they have a stake 
in its trajectory.  
 
We outline a typology of strategies for influencing stakeholders, drawing both 
on published literature, and on data from 2 sex-worker-led HIV/AIDS 
interventions in India.  
 
HIV in India: Why focus on community-stakeholder 
engagement?  
 
In India, HIV infections are concentrated in three historically marginalised 
social groups: female sex workers, men who have sex with men, and injecting 
drug users (Chandasekharan et al., 2007; NACO, 2006). The HIV prevention 
policies of both national government and international philanthropic 
organisations focus their efforts on these three “high risk groups” (NACO, 
2006, p.ii), giving a special role to Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). 
CBOs are defined in this context as organisations of people categorised as 
members of one of the “high risk groups”, e.g. sex workers’ organisations. 
India’s National AIDS Control Programme III (2006-2011) aims for 50% of all 
targeted HIV prevention interventions to be handed over to CBOs by 2011 
(NACO, 2006).  
 
While respecting the skills and role of marginalised communities is laudable, 
there are also strong arguments that relying on communities alone is 
unrealistic (Nair & Campbell, 2008). Affected communities often lack control 
over their health-related behaviour, with the actions of more powerful others 
having a determining influence (Campbell, Nair & Maimane, 2007). At the 
level of the sexual encounter, sex workers’ male clients and managers often 
have greater control over whether condoms are used than does the sex 
worker herself (Sedyaningsih-Mamahit & Gortmaker, 1999). At the level of 
HIV prevention projects, sex workers’ active participation has often been 
undermined by risks of stigmatisation, or police repression (Asthana & 
Oostvogels, 1996). From a more positive point of view, stakeholders such as 
representatives of public services or politicians have the potential to channel 
useful resources to sex workers in their HIV prevention efforts (Basu et al., 
2004). Overall, this line of argument is a case for community organisations to 
make special efforts to manage their relationships with others so as to be in a 
position to influence them in positive ways. Such arguments are making their 
way into policy and practice, with some form of networking with stakeholders 
becoming a key recommended component of interventions (e.g. NACO, 
2007). It is not yet clear, however, what strategies community organisations 
might use to influence their stakeholders.  
 
Building bridging social capital  
 
We reviewed literature on community-stakeholder relations in the context of 
HIV/AIDS, to begin to elucidate possible strategies for building bridging social 
capital. Although not explicitly identified in the literature as ‘strategies for 
building bridging social capital’, 3 potential approaches emerged. We define 
these three approaches here, to provide a context for the presentation of our 
findings. We then use our presentation of data to illustrate these strategies in 
action, to explore the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy, and to 
consider the conditions under which each strategy appears most suitable. 
 
In practice and policy, in India, the main means suggested for winning local 
support is ‘doing advocacy’ or ‘sensitisation’. These take the form of meetings 
between sex workers and police, policy-makers or the media (Avahan, 2008; 
NACO, 2007; Biradavolu, Burris, George, Jena, & Blankenship, 2009; 
Dandona et al, 2005). Such meetings are intended to provide information to 
the stakeholders, to clear up misunderstandings, reduce stigma, and provide 
an opportunity to make a request for help. We call this approach ‘persuading’. 
 
The second approach, protesting, is informed by a tradition of social 
movement literature, and argues that the strength of community mobilisation 
efforts is in their ability to mobilise collective protests, demanding recognition 
of their rights and practical support from stakeholders (De Castro-Silva et al., 
2008; Parker & Aggleton, 2005). In contrast to the polite overtures of the 
persuading approach, collective protest is combative and adversarial.  
 
Persuading and protesting are relatively well-established and distinct 
approaches to securing better treatment by local stakeholders. Recent 
ethnographic work suggests an additional, more complex and contradictory 
approach, using concepts such as ‘patron-client’ relations (Evans & Lambert, 
2008; Swidler, 2009) or ‘rewarding engagement’ (Friedman & Mottiar, 2005). 
These authors have found that community organisations often do not choose 
to pose themselves as adversaries through protest, nor do they simply seek to 
influence through verbal requests. Rather, communities are portrayed as 
engaging with their stakeholders, negotiating support, and making bargains. 
In this paper, we use the term ‘exchanging favours’ to describe this third 
approach.  
 
Study sites  
 
Our study is based in two of the longest-established and highest profile sex-
worker-led CBOs in India.  
 
DMSC1 (Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee, or Unstoppable Women’s 
United Committee) is an organization of sex workers based in Kolkata, with a 
presence throughout West Bengal. Working in partnership with an NGO, the 
STD/HIV Intervention Programme (or SHIP), by 2001, DMSC was running 
HIV prevention interventions in 51 sites, claiming to serve 40,000 sex 
workers, and by 2008, DMSC claimed a membership of 65,000. Outcome 
evaluations of their HIV interventions have demonstrated increases in condom 
use and decreases in STIs (Jana et al 1998; Basu et al, 2004).  
 
VAMP2 (Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad, or Prostitutes’ Organisation Against 
Injustice) is a sex workers’ collective based in an agricultural area of 
Maharashtra, in the town of Sangli. In collaboration with an NGO, called 
SANGRAM, VAMP operates in rural areas, along highways, in villages and 
towns along the Maharashtra-Karnataka border, seeking to support a 
population of approximately 5,000 sex workers.  
 
Both CBOs were formally established in 1995, emerging from NGO-led HIV 
prevention programmes initiated in the early 1990s. The CBOs now run the 
HIV prevention activities, which centre on peer education delivered by sex 
workers, STI clinics, and condom distribution. However, they have also 
significantly expanded the scope of their work. In the early years of the 
interventions, sex workers and the social workers and activists who worked 
with them developed an increasingly social and contextual understanding of 
the threats to sex workers’ health (Jana, Basu, Rotheram-Borus, & Newman, 
2004). The lack of a sufficient income was a major risk factor. In addition, they 
noted that HIV/AIDS appeared a distant threat to sex workers who faced daily 
harassment or violence from local men, or risked arrest and extortion in police 
raids. Such groups also undermined HIV prevention efforts, for instance, 
intimidating health promotion workers, refusing access to buildings, or 
                                            
1 For more information, see www.durbar.org 
2 See www.sangram.org 
refusing to allow public health promotion events to take place. In response, 
both DMSC and VAMP broadened their activities, to include advocating with a 
wide group of stakeholders, seeking to win their support for their HIV 
prevention work.  
 
This paper focuses on the efforts of DMSC and VAMP to influence the actions 
of three groups of people who have a profound effect on sex workers’ lives 
within the red light area: the police, politicians, and local social organisations. 
 
The power nexus in the red light areas     
 
On the borders of legality and illegality, the subject of stigmatisation and fear, 
the red light areas are relatively contained communities, isolated from their 
neighbours. They are not disorganised, but have complex social hierarchies, 
in which three interlinked groups are of particular local importance. 
 
Firstly, the police have an active interest in the red light areas, due to the 
potentially incriminating activities being undertaken. The roles of the police 
include conducting raids to rescue trafficked women or minors, stopping sex 
workers from soliciting publicly (through arrests or threats of arrest), and 
pursuing sex workers’ complaints against troublemakers (Biradavolu et al., 
2009). According to sex workers, policing practices are seriously flawed, with 
raids often violent, traumatic, and resulting in wrongful arrests, police reluctant 
to register sex workers’ complaints, and frequent demands for large bribes.  
 
Secondly, politicians whose constituency includes the red light area seek to 
exert their influence to obtain votes, using both threats and offers of support. 
They can promise better infrastructure, smooth the way for individual sex 
workers and the CBO in their interactions with government offices or police, 
help sex workers to resolve local problems, or threaten a loss of support or 
punishment if they are not elected.  
 
The politicians’ local presence is made tangible through the third important set 
of actors, local social organisations, which include the local branches of the 
political parties, clubs associated with the parties, and the strong arm of 
goondas (locally translated as ‘anti-socials’ or ‘rowdies’, goondas are men 
whose reputation for violence and coercion makes people obey their 
demands). The underground and conflictual nature of red light areas means 
that sex workers have often had a need for powerful men to take their side in 
conflicts or disputes. Local goondas and local organisations (with the back up 
of political parties) have fulfilled that role, in exchange for protection money 
and votes. Politicians need the help of local organisations to bring out voters, 
and consequently may turn a blind eye to sexual exploitation and physical 
abuse carried out by members of these organisations.  
 
Against this unpromising background, both CBOs have managed to negotiate 
significantly improved relationships with each of these local groups. In relation 
to the police, sex workers’ complaints are now much more likely to be 
registered and attended to, and violent raids are fewer. Politicians have used 
their influence to provide significant infrastructure: in Sangli, improving the 
roads and drainage, and in Kolkata, donating land for the construction of a 
clinic. Both CBOs have developed a more ‘live and let live’ relation with the 
local organisations, so that there is less direct harassment and opposition, 
and occasional cooperation. In this paper, we seek to understand what the 
sex workers' organisations have done to foster those more supportive 
relations. 
Methods  
 Data collection  
 
Data collection in Kolkata was carried out by RB (3rd author), and in Sangli by 
AS (2nd author). Both are women with several years of experience working 
with sex workers and fluent in the local language. Data collection began in 
each site with an orientation phase, in which interviews and observations 
were undertaken jointly by the 1st author and the 2nd/3rd authors, in the interest 
of achieving consistency. Observation notes were recorded in daily fieldwork 
diaries. The present analysis focuses on observations of events where the 
CBOs came into contact with their stakeholders, such as a confrontation with 
police, or a public meeting with politicians in attendance. We draw on 
interviews with project employees, including both sex worker employees (30) 
and non-sex-worker employees (15), and interviews with representatives of 
politicians, police, and local social organizations (12). See Table 1 for details 
of the sample used for the present analysis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Data analysis  
 
We analysed the data from DMSC and VAMP together, with the aim of 
producing an interpretation which made sense of stakeholder relations in both 
cases. Analysis took place in 3 stages. The first, descriptive stage, conducted 
by the 1st and 2nd authors, extracted every reference to the relationship 
between the CBOs and their important stakeholders. Using this data, the 
second, analytical stage (conducted by the 1st author), sought to condense 
this array of references into a set of distinct strategies. Interpretation of the 
strategies and choice of terminology was achieved in team meetings among 
all 3 authors. We conducted a workshop and meetings with both CBOs to 
share our initial interpretations and seek critical feedback. Their feedback 
generally concurred with our analysis but added nuance and precision.  
 
Findings 
 
Persuading 
 
We use the term ‘persuading’ to describe efforts to win stakeholders’ support 
which are based on friendly overtures and verbal requests, without the force 
of any other kind of leverage. DMSC and VAMP members create a great 
variety of opportunities to build connections. DMSC has a designated ‘Liaison 
Officer’ who is well acquainted with police officers, government officers, 
journalists, celebrities, and the red light area’s political representatives at 
local, state and national levels. She has their phone numbers on her mobile 
phone, and can request a meeting. Persuading is used in a range of forms – 
from relatively formal invited meetings, to small-scale visits, and informal 
relationship-building.  
 
In Kolkata, the STD/HIV Intervention Programme’s funding stream requires 
that the Project holds various meetings in its intervention areas – in the 
largest area, Sonagachi, the target is 30 meetings per month. These meetings 
are held for a variety of local groupings, including madams, pimps, police, 
male clients of sex workers, members of the local clubs, sex workers’ 
boyfriends, and local sex workers. The format of the meetings is usually that 
15 to 40 people are brought together for about 1 hour, to listen to short talks 
presented by DMSC representatives. Common themes are educational talks 
on HIV prevention and transmission, an explanation of the work that DMSC 
does, and a request for help (or at least for no obstruction) in carrying out that 
work.  The audience usually sits quietly and is invited to ask questions after 
the speeches. Snacks are served, and signatures or thumb impressions are 
taken to record how many people attended, as part of the project’s reporting 
procedures. In the meetings which we observed, a relatively formal 
atmosphere prevailed, with little discussion between audience and speakers. 
The audience were pleased to receive their packets of snacks, and appeared 
keen to leave as soon as the meeting was concluded.  
 
Both organisations also initiate smaller-scale, more informal meetings with 
their stakeholders including politicians, police, and local clubs. VAMP 
employees described meetings which they held with local small stall-holders 
or shopkeepers in the red light area, asking them not to harass the sex 
workers, and educating them about sexual health. They outlined a key 
argument (which DMSC workers have also used with the intermediaries in the 
sex trade) that the shopkeepers’ business depended upon the sex workers, 
and thus that the shopkeepers should respect the sex workers and facilitate 
VAMP’s work. At meetings with police and politicians, both organizations 
typically begin by explaining the nature of their work, emphasising that it is not 
threatening, that they are doing good work, and making the case that sex 
workers should not be stigmatised or discriminated against.  
 
Our members would go to police station and explain to the police about 
VAMP.  We would tell them: “we work in the health field for the 
prevention of HIV. Ours is a budding organization.”  We would ask for 
their support. Police realized the authenticity of our organization 
working for sex workers. We have done small plays in the police station 
as well.  We gave them information on HIV, STD, and the importance 
of condoms. (VAMP, Project worker, int 10).  
 
Not all of the overtures made by DMSC and VAMP come with an explicit 
request for help. On her visits to government offices, DMSC’s Liaison Officer 
would pop her head around the door of her contacts, in her words, to say ‘hi, 
hello’, with no apparent agenda other than maintaining a sense of friendliness. 
VAMP workers mentioned an occasion where they visited the police station, 
upon the retirement of a police officer, to garland him and wish him well.  
 
The effectiveness of such apparently unconditional relationship-building is 
difficult to assess. Employees of both DMSC and VAMP felt that friendly 
relations and a sense of familiarity with the project and its representatives 
were key starting points for more substantial requests or negotiations, 
although they may not have produced any immediate outcome. Inviting a 
politician to inaugurate a clinic, or requesting a meeting with a senior police 
officer, for instance, were seen to be facilitated by a sense of familiarity. 
 
 
Protesting  
  
Both DMSC and VAMP explicitly articulate a philosophy of empowerment in 
which solidarity or unity among sex workers is of primary importance. Inspired 
by the labour movement and women's movements, they cite 'strength in 
numbers' as the source of their power, through their ability to mobilise large 
numbers of women to protest and demand fairer treatment. In both sites, 
representatives of the sex workers' organisations described instances where 
they had called together a large group of women to protest at the police 
station, at government offices, or to politicians. The visible and noisy presence 
of a large group (often over 100) in a public protest is difficult for their 
stakeholders to ignore, drawing public attention and disrupting their everyday 
activities. A focus group of sex worker leaders of DMSC discussed how they 
had taken this approach to a national scale. In 2008, a Bill (modifications to 
the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act) was before the Indian Parliament 
which sought to criminalise renting out a premises for the purposes of sex 
work (i.e. criminalising brothel-keepers), and purchasing sexual services (i.e. 
criminalising clients) among other things. DMSC strongly opposed the Bill, 
arguing that it made sex workers' livelihood impossible, and organised a 
series of rallies in 3 Indian states and at the Indian Parliament in Delhi.  
 
Once established and recognised, the sex workers' organisations no longer 
have to actually hold a protest, but simply to threaten one. For example, one 
of VAMP's Project Workers explained how the sex workers in one area 
generally support a particular political party, because a former Chief Minister 
of the state had donated government land for the building of their houses – so 
that their homes and brothels had a more secure status. If the current 
politicians of that party neglect to help the sex workers, they have threatened 
a demonstration (dharna) at the statue of the former Chief Minister, to protest 
that the party betrays his memory.  
 
While our research participants were enthusiastic about the role of collective 
protest, our observations revealed that it is not used indiscriminately or even 
frequently. During our 6 months of fieldwork in each site, for instance, there 
were no cases of confrontational collective protests. Among the participants' 
discussions of previous protests, three types of issues were likely to trigger a 
protest: a violent police raid, a failure of government services to provide sex 
workers with their entitlements (e.g. to free condoms or appropriate treatment 
at the hospital), and a failure of politicians to represent the interests of the sex 
workers' constituency. Collective protest was not used to influence local social 
organisations. What is common in instances of collective protest is that the 
stakeholders have an important public image to protect, and the sex workers 
are able to occupy a 'moral high ground' with symbolic legitimacy (being 
denied their entitlements, discriminated against, or subject to violence and 
harassment). Both organisations' protests are usually supported and 
enhanced by activists and journalists – enabled by the sense of legitimacy of 
their demands and the public interest in the topic. 
 
Confirming that collective protest is only used under restricted conditions, 
representatives of both organisations spoke of careful efforts to maintain 
friendly relations with police, politicians and other social organisations, and 
only to use their collective strength as a last resort.  
 
“Sometimes we need to speak to them [police] sweetly and sometimes 
in fight.”  (VAMP, Project worker, int 2) 
 
“This is my personal thinking that instead of categorizing an individual 
as enemy, its better to keep him neutral. I will maintain this in my work.” 
(DMSC, Project Worker, int 3)  
 
Exchanging favours  
 
The two approaches discussed thus far allow for a choice between a non-
confrontational ‘rapport-building’ approach which might create familiarity but 
has little forcefulness, and a confrontational ‘protest’ approach which has 
force, and perhaps risks creating enemies. The third approach, ‘exchanging 
favours’ is a more nuanced and ambiguous process, in which the CBOs have 
creatively identified ways in which they can offer something of value to their 
stakeholders, explicitly or implicitly, in return for their co-operation.  
Exchanging favours with politicians  
Sex workers' primary means of influencing politicians is through their role as 
voters in a politician's constituency. For instance, a local-level politician in 
Maharashtra, who became a crucial supporter, was initially approached at 
election time, by 4-5 representatives, requesting his presence in their red light 
area for 10 minutes every day.  
 
During campaigning, you have to reassure everyone who is in front of 
you.  So I said ‘okay’. (VAMP, local politician, int 14).  
 
Upon his election, he followed up his commitment and learnt of ongoing 
exploitation of the women by goondas connected with the opposing political 
party which had previously been in power. Perhaps with a political motivation 
to undermine the opposition, perhaps with a motivation to help his 
constituents, he proceeded to use his authority with the police to prevent 
further exploitation of the women. Exchanging votes for supportive action is a 
relatively formalised and familiar relation with politicians. In other instances, 
the exchange is less explicit.  
 
During our fieldwork in Kolkata, on several occasions, politicians from the 
local, state, and national levels accepted invitations to public events being 
hosted by DMSC, such as an event promoting DMSC's work on anti-
trafficking, a celebration of International Women's Day, and a festival 
celebrating sex workers' international collective struggle for their rights. DMSC 
was keen to secure the politicians’ presence, to bestow public legitimacy upon 
their project, to demonstrate to the politician their levels of local support, and 
to encourage the politician to endorse their various causes. 
 
Politicians, of course, do not have to accept the CBOs' invitations to attend 
their events, yet many do. What do they stand to gain by attending? They are 
usually invited to take up an important formal role, such as Chief Guest, or 
speaker, which furthers their public image as important people responding to 
the needs of the downtrodden. In this regard, sex workers’ recognition as 
‘poor, fallen women’, among the most destitute and hopeless in society, who 
thus deserve the attention and help from respected members of society, 
becomes a resource that they can capitalise upon. Their status at the bottom 
of the social hierarchy gives sex workers value in the eyes of the media as a 
potential good story, and by association, in the eyes of politicians, who may 
stand to gain positive media coverage through doing ‘good social work’for 
‘poor sex workers’. In Kolkata, we observed that the presence of politicians 
and journalists at the CBOs’ public meetings were mutually reinforcing. The 
presence of one was invariably accompanied by the presence of the other, 
and in one instance, as soon as a prominent politician had finished his 
speech, leaving the venue early, the journalists promptly departed. 
 
Meeting the politicians’ interests, in this way, is not unproblematic, however. 
Both CBOs encourage an activist, de-stigmatising, and empowering discourse 
about sex workers which refuses to accept that they are poor victims in need 
of help from kindly donors. In Kolkata, at a public meeting concerning the 
problem of trafficking, the Member of Parliament’s speech went directly 
against the CBO’s philosophy, with a suggestion that the sex workers 
primarily wanted to leave the sex trade and that the government and NGOs 
should help them to do so. The fieldworker observing the event was surprised 
that the CBO representatives, although they campaign against this point of 
view vociferously and daily, let the politician speak his mind without a 
challenge. Discussions after the event revealed that the CBO representatives 
did not wish to take any risks with the politician's support, and felt it more 
important to maintain that relationship than to initiate an argument. In this 
instance, we are suggesting that there is an informal and implicit exchange of 
a useful public platform for the politician's practical and symbolic support.  
 
Holding such events is made possible by the existence of an HIV prevention 
project, which mandates and funds a certain number of public meetings at 
regular intervals, and the sex workers' organisation's access to membership 
fees, which can also be used to fund public events. Such resources are 
creatively capitalised upon by the CBOs, to create media-friendly events of 
interest to politicians. Even without any formal agreement of their exchange, 
the prospect of benefiting from future public platforms binds politicians into a 
reciprocal relationship with the CBOs.  
 
Exchanging favours with local social organisations  
 
Unlike the police and politicians, the local clubs and organisations are not in 
any formal way answerable to sex workers (so protest is an unlikely strategy). 
Hence, exchanging favours is particularly useful. To garner the local clubs' 
support, DMSC offers to support their social activities, such as sports days for 
children or religious festivals. VAMP has faced particular opposition from local 
branches of political parties which are concerned with the emancipation of 
dalit people (formerly called 'untouchable'). These parties are opposed to 
Hinduism because of its association with the caste system, and opposed to 
sex work, because they see it as exploitation of dalit women. They were 
especially enraged at the sex workers’ celebration of the 'tying the beads' 
ceremony, a Hindu religious ritual accompanying the entrance of young 
women to the sex trade (in the Devadasi system). For some time, they were 
at loggerheads, causing significant obstacles to the CBO’s work. To deal with 
this conflict, VAMP activists came up with a compromise. They emphasised to 
the political groups that their aims were the same: to empower and 
emancipate dalit women, and offered to create and fund a public celebration 
of Ambedkar Jayanti – the festival celebrating the birthday of Babasaheb 
Ambedkar, the founder of the modern movement against untouchability – 
instead of celebrating 'tying the beads'. The local political groups were 
pleased with a ‘free’ festival supporting their interests and advancing their 
mission and profile locally. Subsequently, sex workers reported, they became 
much more accepting of the CBO.  
 
Exchanging favours with the police  
 
The sex workers have an additional resource to draw upon in their relations 
with the police, in the form of laws protecting citizen's rights. Project workers 
in both sites mention legal awareness as having played a key role in sex 
workers' negotiations for more favourable policing. In this sense, they do not 
regard fair treatment by the police as a 'favour' but as their entitlement. The 
importance of this formal route to improving policing practices does not 
preclude the operation of more informal exchanges, however.  
 
During one of the research team meetings with representatives of VAMP, a 
participant excused himself to take a phone call from the Police Inspector. It 
transpired that the Police Inspector was investigating a robbery, had few 
leads, and was calling to request the sex workers’ help. Living and working in 
the red light areas, sex workers have privileged access to information and 
awareness regarding criminal or suspicious activities. In response to a 
question about what had convinced the police to reduce arrests and abuse of 
sex workers, one Project Worker explained:  
 
Also, police benefited from us. We provide them with information of 
goondas and robbers who spend a lot of money. Or inform them about 
fake money. This way the rapport developed.  (VAMP, Project Worker, 
int 2).  
 
Thus, gaining access to information about criminal activities is an incentive for 
the police to co-operate with the sex workers. Although it is not spoken of by 
either side as an explicit exchange of one incentive for another, and VAMP 
representatives speak more generally in terms of 'building rapport', this 
information is a resource which they consciously use to influence the police. 
 
Offering such a favour to the police does not transform the relationship 
entirely: raids, arrests and discriminatory treatment of sex workers persist, but 
according to our informants, have reduced in frequency. Nor is this approach 
without risks. Suspected criminals are also powerful stakeholders in the red 
light areas. Informing on them risks retribution, so it must be done with care. 
Moreover, if the accused is a son of a local sex worker, or in a position of 
power within the sex trade, sex workers may avoid informing on them, as it 
would risk creating a difficult conflict.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have presented a threefold typology of strategies available to 
marginalised communities to influence their local stakeholders: persuading, 
protesting, and exchanging favours. We here discuss each strategy in turn, 
examining its particular strengths and weaknesses, and considering its 
relation to the concept of social capital. We then consider implications of our 
argument for HIV prevention practice.   
 
Although the polite and friendly activities of ‘persuading’ have no forceful 
leverage over the stakeholder, and do not observably result in concrete 
supportive action, they are considered by Project Workers to be a key 
foundation for later requests. From a social capital point of view, such 
activities may be generating ‘weak social ties’, i.e. relationships of 
acquaintance, which have been argued to play an important role in improving 
people’s prospects (Granovetter, 1983).  
 
Collective protest, in contrast to ‘persuading’, is undertaken with specific 
demands, forcefully backed up by an embarrassing or inconvenient public 
demonstration. Somewhat counter to the ‘‘bridging social capital’ perspective 
that collaborative relationships are preferable to conflictual ones, the CBOs 
sometimes decided that their stakeholders’ behaviour was intolerable and that 
the risks of creating antagonism by mobilising a protest were justified. On the 
other hand, their frequent efforts to avoid conflict do suggest that collaborative 
relationships were highly prized. 
 
Finally, we have sought to draw attention to ‘exchanging favours’ as a 
potentially powerful way of gaining leverage over stakeholders, by offering 
them something which they value. Exchanging favours is fraught with 
dilemmas, as the CBOs find themselves advancing the stakeholders’ interests 
which may be at odds with their own. Exchange relations are a form of social 
capital backed up by mutual interest in co-operation, rather than by goodwill. 
They are stronger than ‘weak ties’ of familiarity, being based on valued 
resources and the potential of reciprocation.  
 
In our case studies, we have found that both CBOs draw on all 3 strategies 
fluidly in calculated efforts to cultivate support. None of these strategies is 
ultimately preferable over another. The most appropriate strategy depends 
upon the context, including the degree of establishment of the CBO. A 
fledgling CBO, without a fully developed membership or public profile may not 
be in a position to sustain the risks of protest, or have a favour worth offering. 
At early stages, persuasion may be important as a foundation for later 
exertion of pressure. As they become more established and acquire a history 
of effective protest or exchanges of favours, CBOs’ persuasive efforts may 
gain additional traction, with possible protest or exchanges of favours 
motivating stakeholders’ co-operation. Related to this time dimension is an 
important question of ‘who’ represents CBOs in negotiations with 
stakeholders. Stakeholders may initially not recognise sex workers as 
legitimate negotiators, preferring to speak to non-community advocates. The 
process of shifting from non-sex-worker representatives to sex worker 
representatives raises complex issues worthy of further investigation 
 
For HIV prevention practice, our analysis suggests that the currently 
recommended ‘rapport-building’ skills for CBOs are only a first step in 
equipping community organizations to build productive relations with their 
stakeholders. To capitalise on the friendly rapport that they build, CBOs need 
highly sophisticated skills in political thinking and strategic negotiation – so 
that they may make good judgements about when and how to employ protest, 
or offer an exchange of favours. Establishing an HIV/AIDS intervention is a 
complex, multifaceted, and political task. If community organisations are to be 
tasked with running HIV prevention programmes, they need to become 
sophisticated political actors, not simply grassroots health promoters.  
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 Table 1: Interviewees 
 
 
  DMSC VAMP Totals 
Sex worker 
project staff 
11 
 
19 30 
Non-sex worker 
project staff 
10 5 15 
Politicians  5 1 6 
Police  2 1 3 
Local social 
organisations 
2 1 3 
Totals  30 27 57 
 
 
 
